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Abstract
Investors and academics increasingly criticize that various design features of executive stock option
(ESO) plans reflect self-dealing by managers and the inability of corporate governance mechanisms in
monitoring executives (managerial power hypothesis). We use a unique and not publicly available data
set to investigate design features of ESO programs. The companies in our sample show a very large
variation with respect to the characteristics of their ESO plans (e.g. in the use of relative performance
targets that need to be met before options become exercisable). We study the relationship between the
design of ESO plans and corporate governance structures to test the managerial power hypothesis. We
document that when governance structures are weak, option plans are designed in a way desired by
managers. When ownership concentration is low, firms more often have ESO plans that are favorable
to executives. We also find that firms with fewer outside board members and weaker creditor rights
more often have option plans that are favorable to managers. Favorable ESO plans usually coincide
with large option packages.
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Recently, active institutional investors and shareholder activists have sharply criticized
various features of stock option plans. They argue that the design of many stock option
programs is an example of managerial self-dealing and finally illustrates the inability of
existing corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring executives. At the same time,
there is increasing criticism in the academic literature saying that both the escalation
and the design of stock option compensation reflect managerial rent-seeking rather than
optimal contracting. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) and Bebchuk et al. (2002), for ex-
ample, argue that managers exercise their influence to maximize wealth transfers with
stock options. In their view, executive compensation reflects agency problems rather than
solving them and weak corporate governance structures lead to an inefficient design of
stock option plans. Bebchuk and Fried as well as Bebckuk et al. argue that features of
stock option plans like no indexing to market movements, exercise prices that equal mar-
ket prices at grant dates and option repricings can be seen as evidence consistent with this
kind of self-dealing. They claim that the greater the power of managers and the weaker the
governance system, the greater their ability to self-deal by influencing executive pay in a
way that is favorable to them (the so-called managerial power hypothesis).1 The problem
of managerial self-dealing when governance structures are weak is known for quite a long
time as a quote from Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in their often cited corporate governance
survey shows: “The more serious problem with high powered incentive contracts is that
they create enormous opportunities for self-dealing for the managers, especially if these
contracts are negotiated with poorly motivated boards of directors rather than with large
shareholders.”2
It is well documented that managers possess significant control rights and that they use
their discretion in firms to benefit themselves personally in various ways (by expropriating
funds, empire building, consumption of perquisites, no cash-out of free cash flow, or by
entrenching themselves in positions that make it difficult to displace them when they per-
1Hall and Murphy (2003) contradict this hypothesis by claiming that governance structures have improved in the past
preventing the self-dealing by corporate officers.
2Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 745.
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form badly).3 Moreover, there is little doubt that managers have at least some influence
on the level, structure, and design of their compensation packages. As pointed out by
Murphy (1999), the process in which the structure and design of compensation schemes
is developed is likely to be exposed to managerial power. Usually, initial recommenda-
tions for incentive plans are developed by the internal human resources departments and
not by independent advisors.4 Moreover, compensation recommendations often need the
approval of top managers before being passed to the compensation committee. Managers
can therefore influence compensation proposals in their own interests.
Following this line of argument, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) state that recent empirical
research “... suggests that the process of determining compensation is better described
as a negotiation process between the board and the CEO” rather than by an optimal
contracting approach.5 It is therefore evident to ask to what extent the design of stock
option programs is correlated with variables influencing this bargaining process. We can
think of factors such as the structure and composition of the board, the existence of
blockholders or differences in legal regimes. Due to data limitations, existing research has
not provided an answer to this question yet. So far, there is no evidence on whether the
design of executive stock option (ESO) plans is related to shareholder structures or the
composition of boards of directors.
Recent research in the field of corporate finance suggests that inside board members,
large boards, busy chairmen or the absence of large blockholders result in less effective
monitoring and in weak corporate governance.6 Based on this work, we want to investigate
in this study whether there exists a significant association between the design of executive
stock option programs and the structure of a firm’s corporate governance. We therefore
investigate the design of ESO programs and try to explain the observed variation in
the design of these programs with differences in the corporate governance schemes of
firms. Simply put, we examine whether firms with weak governance structures have stock
option programs that are designed in a way that is desired by managers. We hereby test
3See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 1997) or Jensen (1986).
4Even if outside compensation consultants are involved, it is unlikely that they work independently as their fees depend
on the mandates of the advised companies.
5Ryan and Wiggins (2004), p. 498.
6See Becht et al. (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) or Holderness (2003) for surveys.
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the managerial power hypothesis developed in Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004). A stock
option plan is desired by managers if there is no link to corporate performance and if the
ESO plan is not transparent to shareholders and hence minimizes the outrage that results
from the recognition of the option plan by the public (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).7
To study the association between governance structures and ESO design, data on Euro-
pean stock option programs provides a promising environment. Due to accounting and tax
regulations, the variation in the design of ESO programs for U.S. firms is rather limited
compared to European firms (see Murphy, 1999). U.S. firms, for example, usually do not
use performance-based ESO programs because tax and accounting rules would otherwise
imply adverse cost effects.8 Our data on European stock option plans therefore provides
the unique opportunity to test the importance of governance structures for the design of
ESO programs. European stock option plans show large variations with respect to their
design features and hence provide a natural environment for an attempt to test the man-
agerial power hypothesis. We are able to use detailed data on the stock option programs
very large European corporations belonging to the Euro Stoxx 50, the Stoxx 50, and the
DAX 30. Our data set includes information on five core design features of the ESO pro-
grams of these firms: on relative and absolute performance requirements, on accounting
treatments, participation structures, and on the transparency of the programs. Data on
performance requirements and participation structures are usually not publicly available
in Europe. We gathered our ESO data with the help of Union Investment, the third largest
mutual fund manager in Germany, who conducted a mail survey to receive the ESO data
we needed to test the managerial power hypothesis. Comparable with CalPERS in the
U.S., Union Investment is known as a very strong supporter of good corporate governance
arrangements in firms. To our knowledge, comparable ESO design data is not available for
the U.S. We combine the data on the design features of the ESO plans with hand-collected
data on the corporate governance structures (ownership structures, board structures and
legal structures) of our sample firms.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find that the firms in our data set show
7See below for a more formal definition of a stock option plan that is desired by executives.
8ESO Programs without performance conditions were treated preferably according to tax and FASB accounting rules,
see, e.g., Bebchuk et al. (2002).
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very large heterogeneity with regard to the implementation of their stock option plans.
The companies, for example, exhibit a very wide variation in the use of relative perfor-
mance targets that need to be met before options become exercisable. While some firms
require the outperformance of competitors in the same industry, others use no relative
performance evaluation at all. We document that when governance structures are weak,
option plans are more likely to be designed in a way that is desired by executives. More
specifically, we find that cross-sectionally, ownership variables are related to the ESO de-
sign in a way that is consistent with the managerial power hypothesis. When ownership
concentration is low and the exposition to the U.S. capital market little, firms have ESO
plans implemented that are more favorable to their executives. This finding supports the
view that controlling shareholders are important in monitoring managerial compensation
and behavior. Our evidence on the role of blockholders complements findings of related
studies documenting that large shareholders play an active role in corporate governance.
Our cross-sectional findings further suggest that firms with insider-dominated boards are
more likely to have stock option plans that are favorably designed. More specifically, we
find that a higher percentage of outsiders is generally associated with ESO programs that
are less favorable to managers. Further support for the self-dealing view is provided by
the finding that firms with weaker creditor rights more often have ESO plans that are
desired by top managers. Our results are robust to many different specifications of our
main dependent variable that captures the ESO design. They are also robust to different
specifications of the regression models. In the robustness section, we also take the volume
of the option packages that were granted to CEOs and the overall level of CEO com-
pensation into account. Our estimations suggest that more favorable ESO plans usually
coincide with larger option packages.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the literature
that links corporate governance, executive compensation, and self-dealing. Section 3 de-
rives benchmarks for the assessment of executive stock option programs. We use these
benchmarks as well as the managerial power literature to assess whether a specific ESO
plan is desired by managers or not. This section further states the hypothesis we want
to investigate empirically. Section 4 presents our data sets and variables, and provides an
exposition of the empirical strategy that is employed. Section 5 documents our empirical
results on the design of the studied option programs and its relationship to corporate
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governance structures. It also presents an interpretation and discussion of our results. We
also look at various robustness checks of our results. The last section summarizes the main
findings and concludes.
2 Related Literature on Self-Dealing and Executive Compensa-
tion
Several empirical papers have examined the relation between corporate governance struc-
tures and various aspects of executive compensation.
Some studies have looked at whether there is an association between the level of compen-
sation and governance structures. Core et al. (1999), for example, use a sample with CEO
compensation data of 205 publicly traded U.S. firms. They examine the relation between
corporate governance (proxied by board and ownership variables) and CEO compensa-
tion to test whether CEOs earn greater compensation when corporate governance struc-
tures are less effective. Controlling for economic determinants of compensation, they find
that“... CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective.”9
Lambert et al. (1993) also find support for what they call the “managerial-power model”.
Their findings suggest that CEOs get higher salaries when they have appointed a larger
fraction of the board members. The existence of a large external blockholder is negatively
related to the level of executive compensation. Lambert et al. argue that their “... results
provide support for the importance of managerial power in explaining levels of executive
compensation”.10
Other empirical research examines whether corporate governance structures affect the
pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Hartzell and Starks (2003), for
example, find that institutional shareholding concentration and the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of executive compensation are strongly positively related. They show that for an
average executive, an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of institutional
ownership by the five largest shareholders is associated with an estimated 20% increase in
9Core et al. (1999), p. 371.
10Lambert et al. (1993), p. 457.
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the sensitivity of options to stock price changes. Additionally, they find that institutional
ownership concentration is negatively related to the overall level of compensation. In a
recent paper, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that powerful CEOs use their position to
influence the compensation of directors in a way to provide fewer monitoring incentives.
Furthermore, they influence their own pay such that it becomes less sensitive to stock
price changes.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001, 2002) find that “... better governed firms pay their
CEO less for luck” (windfall profits).11 They conclude that their results can not be ex-
plained with a simple contracting approach. Bertrand and Mullainathan argue that their
findings are better explained by a view where CEOs exercise effective power over the
pay-setting process. Newman and Mozes (1999) provide additional evidence suggesting
that observed compensation practices are more likely to be consistent with managerial
self-dealing than with optimal contracting. They document that CEOs receive preferential
treatment when insiders are members of compensation committees. Harvey and Shrieves
(2001) find a significant relationship between ownership and board variables on the one
hand and the use of incentive compensation on the other hand: incentive compensation
is more pronounced in firms with a larger fraction of outsiders on the board and in firms
where blockholders are present.12
Further evidence for a relationship between compensation practices and governance struc-
tures is provided by Yermack (1997). He studies the timing of stock option grants and
finds that CEOs receive stock options shortly prior to the release of good news. Since
stock options are usually granted with a strike price equal to the stock price on the grant
date, CEOs effectively receive in-the-money options by making grants before good news.
Compensation and wealth hereby increase by reasons that are unrelated to managerial
ability, effort or performance. Moreover, he finds that the difference between the stock
price 30 days after grant and the strike price at the grant day is higher in firms with weaker
corporate governance. Similar evidence is provided by Aboody and Kasznik (2000).
11See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), p. 901.
12Similar results are provided by Mehran (1995). He examines the relationship between executive compensation structures
and ownership variables of 153 firms. Mehran finds that companies with more outside directors provide a higher fraction of
their executive compensation in an equity-based form.
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Other studies have examined the association between ownership/board structures and
the repricing of stock options. Some authors provide evidence that option repricing re-
flects governance problems. Chance et al. (2000), for example, find that insider-dominated
boards are more likely to reprice stock options in a way that is favorable to managers
(which suggests managerial entrenchment and self-serving behavior). Similarly, Brenner
et al. (2000) show that the attendance of executives in the compensation committee in-
creases the likelihood of option repricing. Empirical evidence also suggests that managers
tend to time repricing decisions in order to increase option values. Callaghan et al. (2004)
document that this kind of timing is “... more likely in firms with weak corporate gover-
nance”.13
The study that is most closely related to our work is a paper by Pasternack and Rosenberg
(2003). Using a sample of Finnish firms, they study determinants of the scope of ESO
plans, of exercise prices, target groups, and of dividend protection clauses. Their results
suggest that firms with bigger monitoring difficulties use more equity incentives. There
seems to be no association between their incentive measure and ownership structures.
Exercise prices of options and ownership variables also seem to be unrelated. Their results,
however, suggest that institutional ownership increases the likelihood that a broad-based
option plan is used. Pasternack and Rosenberg also show that the degree of foreign stock
owners reduces the likelihood of dividend protection mechanisms in ESO plans.
Overall, empirical evidence seems to suggest that corporate governance schemes and var-
ious aspects of executive compensation are related in a way that is consistent with the
managerial power hypothesis. The relationship between the design of stock option pro-
grams and governance structures is much less explored and also less conclusive. The goal
of our paper is to extend the existing body of literature by explicitly examining the de-
sign features of the ESO plans of the largest European companies and by studying the
important link between corporate governance schemes and the design of stock option
programs.
13Callaghan et al. (2004), p. 1652. Contradicting evidence of no association between corporate governance schemes and
option repricing is provided by Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) who study the relation between option repricing and
diffuse stock ownership as well as institutional ownership. Similarly, Carter and Lynch (2001) find no evidence that the
likelihood of a repricing decision is related to governance problems.
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3 Managerial Power and the Stock Option Design
The managerial power hypothesis suggests that the greater an executives’s power and
the weaker the corporate governance structures, the greater his ability to influence the
design of a stock option plan in a way that is favorable to him. This section discusses
in more detail the design arrangements that are favorable to top executives according
to the managerial power view. Stock option programs evolved as a solution (or at least
as a mitigation) of the agency problem that is caused by the separation of ownership
and control (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is uncontroversial among academics that
equity-based compensation, if well designed, provides effective incentives to top managers.
We therefore take economic insights and suggestions about the ESO design as a benchmark
to evaluate the real ESO programs in our sample.
Agency theory predicts that managers should be awarded for outcomes over which they
have control, and which are informative about the actions they have taken (see Holmstro¨m,
1979, 1982). Stock prices do provide information about the actions taken by managers.
However, they are only noisy measures of executives performance. Efficient compensation
contracts should therefore filter out stock price changes that are due to general market
trends (windfall profits) and that are hence unrelated to managerial performance. From
an optimal contracting point of view, incentive pay should consequently be tied to the
performance relative to comparable firms or competitors and not to absolute performance
as such.14 A relative performance evaluation can essentially be regarded as a way to remove
the noise of stock price movements (see Murphy, 1999). To filter out general industry or
market trends in practice, the vesting of stock options can be made dependent on the
meeting of specific relative performance targets.15 More specifically, a stock option plan
can be constructed such that options become exercisable if and only if the stock price of
the company outperforms a certain benchmark index consisting of main competitors in
the industry. Powerful managers, however, would like to make their exercise gains from
14The so-called relative performance evaluation developed in Holmstro¨m (1982). Some recent papers question the need
for a relative performance evaluation in situations were industry returns and executives outside opportunities are related
(see Oyer, 2004 and Rajgopal et al., 2005). We follow the standard agency literature and related research such as Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001) and assume that compensation contracts need to filter out industry and market effects.
15Bebchuk and Fried (2003) call these kind of ESO programs “reduced-windfall” plans. As an alternative mechanism, one
can link the exercise prices of stock options to market or sector indexes to get a relative evaluation.
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option exercises independent of the pressure to outperform an industry or general market
index. The managerial power view therefore suggests that ESO plan that are favorable to
managers contain no relative performance targets that need to be met before options vest.
By looking at the oil industry, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) empirically study the
implementation of relative performance targets and find that better governed firms pay
their CEO less for windfall profits (which they consider as evidence for the managerial
power approach).
It is sometimes argued that a stock option plan without any absolute performance target
might be problematic as well. Institutional investors and active investors usually ask that
exercises gains by managers should depend on the firm obtaining at least some minimum
stock return that exceeds, for example, the risk-free rate of interest or the firm-specific
cost of capital. In the absence of any absolute return targets, managers might realize
exercise gains even though a stock investment in the firm did not outperform a risk-free
investment. Practitioners therefore regularly demand stock option programs that contain
at least some absolute performance targets. If stock option plans include such benchmarks,
incentive effects naturally increase in the stock return that is required.16 It is therefore
often demanded that a stock option plan should typically include some absolute stock
return thresholds that is required to be met before options become exercisable. On the
contrary, stock option plans that are favorable to executives would rather have no or
only very low absolute performance requirement. As this line of argument is questionable
from a pure agency theoretic point of view, we also perform our empirical analysis with
the exclusion of an absolute performance target as a design feature. It turned out that
our results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of an absolute performance target in the
analysis (see below for details).
Another important aspect of the managerial power hypothesis is camouflage that is used
by executives to minimize outrage costs (see Bebchuk and Frid, 2003). Powerful managers
want to influence their option plans such that the self-dealing and the low performance
targets of their ESO plans are not transparent to their shareholders and the public. One
way to camouflage the self-dealing and to make the ESO plans less transparent is to avoid
the accounting costs of stock options. From an economic point of view, stock options
16At least up to a certain point.
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constitute economic costs to the issuing companies that should be expensed. The cost
of a stock option is the amount an outside investor would pay for the option at the
date of grant, assuming that he shows exercise and forfeiture patterns that are identical
to those of inside employees. In practice, there used to be no legal requirement for the
accounting of stock option plans, and many firms were reluctant to expense the costs
of ESO programs in their accounts. Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 25, for
example, ruled that firms that have set the strike price of their options equal to the stock
price at the date of grant, did not have to expense the costs of their option programs at
all. Instead, they were asked to disclose an estimate of the value of the ESO program in
a footnote. Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123, issued in 1995, recommended that
firms treat stock option programs as an accounting expense and advised them to use the
“fair market value” of options as an estimate for the cost of an ESO plan. However, as
FAS 123 provided firms with the choice to continue reporting according to the older APB
25, only a number of firms actually adopted this economically correct FAS approach (see
Hall and Murphy, 2003).17
Several authors emphasize the economic importance of expensing stock options. Guay et
al. (2003), for example, argue that “... accounting should reflect the true costs of doing
business, and labor acquired through ESO grants is a real economic cost that firms should
deduct from earnings as an expense.”18 Moreover, they expose that accounting for ESOs
leads to a more efficient functioning of the economic system. Interestingly, Guay et al.
also link stock option accounting and corporate governance hypothesizing that better
governed firms would be more likely to expense stock option.19 We can therefore conclude
that well governed firms should expense the costs of their ESO programs to reflect their
true costs of doing business. However, when managers have significant power due to weak
governance structures, firms will rather prefer not to expense their stock options in order
to camouflage the true costs of their ESO plans and to avoid public outrage.
Executives likewise desire stock option plans that are very broad-based and only vaguely
17From 2005 onwards, firms are required to expense the costs of stock options under IFRS 2 and US-GAAP.
18See Guay et al. (2003), p. 409.
19Empirical evidence by Dechow et al. (1996) suggests that managers from firms that were lobbying against the FASB
drafts to expense the costs of options received both a higher total compensation and a higher fraction of compensation in
options.
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defined. Kato et al. (2005), for example, document that large option grants are associated
with opportunistic managerial behavior. Agency theory provides a rationale why it makes
sense to link the compensation of top-managers via stock options to company performance.
It is, however, less clear why managers at lower levels in a firm should also participate in
costly stock option programs. On an individual basis, lower-level employees usually have
a significantly smaller impact on firm performance compared to top-managers, and it is
well known that stock prices are much less informative about the actions takes by these
individuals at lower levels in an organization. Hall and Murphy (2003) therefore argue that
“... it seems implausible that stock options provide meaningful incentives to lower-level
employees”.20 Using empirical data, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) actually find that stock
options for middle-level managers are a very inefficient way of providing incentives.21 We
broad-based and vaguely defined option plans help top managers to camouflage their own
option grants, we hypothesize that more powerful managers prefer such types of stock
option plans.22
Finally, in the interest of a clear-cut evaluation of a firm’s compensation schemes by
investors, shareholders and the public, firms should follow a transparent communication
strategy with respect to their adopted ESO programs (full transparency in the proxy
statements). Disclosures should include information on exercise prices, on the number
of options granted and held per director, on vesting conditions or on dilution effects.
Information of this type allows both shareholders and investors to critically assess the
compensation schemes of firms, their mechanics and incentive effects. As documented in
Bebchuk and Fried (2003), powerful managers would on the contrary rather prefer less
transparent pay practices that camouflage the scope and dilution effects of their ESO
plans.
Our elaborations so far show that the precise form (rather than the pure existence) of
20Hall and Murphy (2003), p. 58. Alternative measures of performance such as divisional profits therefore provide much
more efficient ways to boost incentives at these lower grades (see Bushman et al., 1995 and Ittner et al., 1997).
21They show that for the additional risk imposed on them, very high risk premia need to be paid to get an increase in
effort.
22Note that we do not argue that broad-based option plans are generally bad. Employee stock option might be very useful
in certain industry sectors. We rather argue that broad-based plans are more favorable as they help camouflaging. See Oyer
and Schaefer (2005), Zhang (2002) or Bergman and Jenter (2006) for arguments why firms might use broad-based ESO
plans.
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ESO contracts matters if options are used to motivate managers in an appropriate way.
The above recommendations provide benchmarks that enable us to investigate to what
extent the observed features of the stock option plans in our data set are consistent the
desires by powerful managers. In Subsection 4.2 we show how we operationalize these
benchmarks.
Based on the literature that studied the relationship between governance structures and
executive compensation and based on the managerial power hypothesis, we can formulate
the hypothesis that we want to test empirically:
ESO Program Design = f(Corporate Governance V ariables, Control V ariables) (1)
i.e. we want to test whether the design of stock option programs and governance structures
are related. Our hypothesis is that firms with weaker corporate governance structures have
stock option programs that are more favorable to their executives. Under this hypothesis,
managers behave opportunistically by designing option programs that are desired by them
if governance structures are ineffective and weak.
4 Data Sets and Methodology
4.1 Data Sets
Our empirical analysis is based on the combination of three data sets. The first data set
consists of detailed information on ESO program characteristics of Euro Stoxx 50, Stoxx
50, and DAX 30 companies. It includes information on five core variables of the ESO
programs: relative and absolute performance targets, accounting treatments, participa-
tion structures, and transparency of the respective programs. The program information is
based on a survey that was conducted by Union Investment, the third largest mutual fund
manager in Germany. We have ESO data on all firms that had an executive stock option
with options granted in 2003. Comparable with CalPERS in the U.S., Union Investment
is a very active institutional investor with significant stakes in all large European corpora-
tions. We are therefore very confident that the information gathered by Union Investment
is very reliable and correct. Being one of the largest fund managers in Germany, Union
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Investment was able to exercise considerable power over the companies in the data set
such that they reported the information that was required. We cross-checked the survey
answers with publicly available data (e.g. from 20-F filings).
The second data set includes detailed information on the corporate governance structures
of Euro Stoxx 50, Stoxx 50, and DAX 30 firms. It contains information on various own-
ership variables, on board variables (e.g. structure, size, fraction of outsiders, mandates
of the chairmen) as well as on legal variables. The information is based on hand-collected
data from 20-F filings and annual proxy statements. A third data set comprises infor-
mation on control variables like Tobin’s Q or leverage. The source of data for the latter
variables is Datastream. The year of observation is 2003 (the year in which the examined
ESO plans were granted).
Our combined initial data set consists of 89 firms. Seven firms were dropped because they
abandoned or stopped their stock option programs in 2003. Even though the sample size
of our study is limited, we believe that the uniqueness of our data set provides interesting
and useful results on the link between governance structures and the ESO plan design.
4.2 Measurement of Variables
4.2.1 ESO Design Data
For each company j and for each of the five ESO design features in our data set, i = 1, ..., 5,
we construct a subscores that values the arrangement of the respective design component.
The subscore of program feature i of company j is denoted as Sij. We evaluate a company’s
entire ESO program by constructing a subscore for each of the five program arrangements.
To evaluate whether a firm’s stock option program feature is desired by its executives,
we use the economic benchmarks on the ESO design that were discussed above and the
implications derived from the managerial power hypothesis. The better a subscore, i.e.
the smaller the number of a subscore, the less favorable is a certain design feature to
a firm’s managers. Having evaluated each of the five program features, we construct an
overall ESO Design Score Sj by aggregating the five subscores into an overall score (see
below). A very large number of this overall score suggests that the design of a certain
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ESO plan is very favorable to the firm’s executives. The different cut-off points within the
five subscores were defined and applied to the data by Union Investment. We only have
the categorized ESO data available.
Relative Performance Target S1j is a variable that measures to what extent the vesting
of the options in the ESO program of firm j depends on the meeting of specific relative
performance targets. It takes the value S1j = 1 or 2 if the relative performance target
is an industry specific benchmark (like the average performance of major competitors),
S1j = 3 or 4 if it is a standard market index (e.g. the Euro Stoxx 50), and G1j = 5 if
no benchmark exists at all.23 If a non-standard benchmark exists, the grade depends on
an individual evaluation. Absolute Performance Target S2j is a variable that measures
the absolute stock return that is required before options become exercisable. It takes the
value S2j = 1 if the absolute performance target is larger than 8% p.a., S2j = 2 if it
is between 6% and 8% p.a., S2j = 3 if it is between 4% and 6% p.a., S2j = 4 if it is
between 2% and 4% p.a., and S2j = 5 if it is smaller than 2% p.a. By constructing the
absolute performance target, the moneyness of the options at the grant date was taken
into account. In the robustness section, we also performed our empirical analysis based
on a ESO Design Score that did not the Absolute Performance Target S2j. Accounting
reflects to what extent firms expense the economic costs of their stock option programs.
The variable takes the value S3j = 1 if a fair value accounting approach is used by firm
j (like IFRS 2 or SFAS 123), S3j = 2 if the intrinsic value is expensed, G3j = 3 or 4 if
the APB 25 methodology is used, and S3j = 5 if the stock option program is dilutive
(no disclosure or expense at all). Participation Structure G4j depicts the broadness of a
firm’s stock option plan. It takes the value S4j = 1 if the program is well defined and
of small size, S5j = 2 if it is of medium size, and S5j = 3 if it is very vaguely defined
and very broad-based. Transparency S5j reflects the transparency of the ESO plan of
firm j to the public. It takes the value S5j = 1 if the program is very transparent to
shareholders and investors, S5j = 2 if it is only partly transparent, and S5j = 3 if it
severely lacks transparency (no information on the number of granted options, no data
on dilution effects, etc.).
23Whether a 1 or 2 (3 or 4) was assigned by Union Investment depends on the precise construction and the institutional
design of the respective program feature. The same applies for the following subscores if more than one score value per
category is stated.
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Having graded each of the five program features, we evaluate the overall design of the
stock option program of firm j by aggregating the values of the subscores into a firm-
specific overall ESO Design Score (abbreviated Sj). The construction of this score is
straightforward and follows the methodology employed in Gompers et al. (2003), La Porta
et al. (1998) or Djankov et al. (2006): for each firm we add the values of the subscores
into an overall score of the respective ESO program. The ESO Design Score for a certain
company j is therefore defined as Sj =
∑5
i=1 Sij, with Sj ranging between 5 and 21.
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While this score is very simple by nature, it has the advantage of being transparent and
easily reproducible. Note that a very large number of the score suggests that the design
of a certain ESO plan is very favorable to the top managers.
4.2.2 Corporate Governance Data
We use measures from three different areas to capture managerial power and the cor-
porate governance structures of firms: (1) ownership variables, (2) board variables, and
(3) legal variables. Throughout the paper, we follow the literature and assume that when
governance structures are weak, managers have substantial power over their pay. We em-
ploy four measures for the ownership structure of a firm. To reflect the exposure of a
corporation to the U.S. capital market, we use a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a
corporation is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise. Based on the find-
ings presented in Section 2 (e.g. the study by Hartzell and Starks, 2003), we believe that
ownership structures significantly affect the design of stock option programs. Following,
for example, Mehran (1995), we calculate the percentage of equity that is held by outside
blockholders as a measure of ownership concentration.25 We therefore add the percentages
of equity owned by individual investors, institutional investors, corporations, families or
governments that hold more than 5% of the common stock of a firm. Government owner-
ship is measured by a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the state government or a
24We are aware that the fact that two subscores range between 1 and 3 only (while the others range between 1 and 5)
implies an implicit weighting of the subscores. However, we believe that this weighting is appropriate from an economic point
of view. We believe that both the participation structures and the transparencies of the ESO programs are relatively less
important for a testing of the managerial power hypothesis compared to the remaining three design features. Nevertheless,
we tested in the robustness section whether our results are sensitive to this kind of weighting and found that this is not the
case (see Subsection 5.4).
25If equity holdings and voting rights differ, we use a blockholder’s voting rights.
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government-owned institution holds a stake larger than 5% in the firm, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we capture the effects of family ownership in a firm by a variable that takes the
value 1 if a closed family owns more than 5% in a given firm, an 0 otherwise.
We employ a wide set of measures for the structure and composition of a firm’s board
of directors. To take into account the heterogeneity in European board systems, we use
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm has a unitarian one-tier system with
executive and non-executive directors on the same board (like in Spain or in the United
Kingdom). Similarly, this dummy takes the value 0 if a corporation is governed by a two-
tier system consisting of a supervisory board on the one hand and an executive board on
the other hand (like in Germany or in the Netherlands).
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), among others, argue that larger boards of
directors are less effective as monitors than smaller boards. Supporting this argument,
recent empirical evidence suggests that small boards of directors perform better moni-
toring and are associated with better decisions and superior firm performance (see, e.g.,
Yermack, 1996, Eisenberg et al., 1998 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). We therefore
also study the size of a firm’s board and its association with the ESO design. We measure
board size as the total number of non-executive directors on the board (one-tier system) or
supervisory board (two-tier system). Recent discussions on corporate governance schemes
in Europe stress the importance of independent outside directors for the functioning of an
effective governance in firms. In this vein, several studies show that firms with a higher
fraction of outsiders make better decisions on issues like executive compensation, CEO
turnover or corporate acquisition. (see, e.g. Core et al., 1999, Borokhovich et al., 1996 or
Weisbach, 1988). To account for effects due to independent outside directors, we use a
variable that is defined as the ratio of independent outside directors to the total number of
directors. We define outside directors as members of the board that are neither executives,
retired executives, former executives, employees nor union activists.
Core et al. (1999) argue that outside directors may become less effective as they serve on
‘too many’ boards. Following this conjecture and following other researchers in the field,
we ascertain the number of companies where the chairman is also serving on the board.
We also try to account for the effects of employee representation on the board by using
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if employees are represented on the board of
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directors or supervisory board. Following Ryan and Wiggins (2004), we use CEO tenure
as a further measure of managerial entrenchment and managerial power. We therefore
count the number of years the CEO has been serving on the board of directors of the firm
since his initial appointment.
A third set of corporate governance variables tries to capture differences in creditor rights
(how strong bondholders and banks are protected) and shareholder protection against
managerial expropriation. To measure creditor rights, we employ the data from La Porta
et al. (1998). They use an index that is the result of an aggregation of various different
creditor rights and that ranges between zero and four. A higher number of the index
is associated with stronger creditor rights in a certain country. To measure shareholder
protection against expropriation by corporate insiders, we use the anti self-dealing index
developed in Djankov et al. (2006). A higher number of the index is associated with
stronger protection against self-dealing in a certain country.
Table 1 summarizes the set of governance variables we use in our subsequent analysis.
Control variables we use are firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, business risk, and
past stock returns. The proxy for firm size is the log of the book value of total assets.
Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Consistent with the litera-
ture, our proxy for growth opportunities is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the market value of a
firm’s securities divided by the replacement costs of its tangible assets. We use the Chung
and Pruitt (1994) measure, i.e. the market value of equity, long-term debt, short-term
debt, and preferred stock divided by total assets. Following Mehran (1995), we measure
business risk by the standard deviation of the percentage change of operating income
(sales minus total operating expenses). The latter is measured with annual data ranging
from 1998-2003. Stock Return is the firms’ average annual stock market return for over
the past five years (in percent). We control for industry fixed effects using dummies for the




Our hypothesis is that firms with weak governance structures have stock option plans
that are designed in a way that is desired by managers. We use ordered response models
to test this hypothesis. The ordered response is a discrete ordered outcome and given by
our ESO Design Score Sj. Ordered response models are used to exploit the ordinal and
ordered character of the score data. The fact that a stock option plan with an ESO Design
Score of 15 is more favorable to executives than a plan with an ESO Design Score of 14
conveys valuable information that we want to make use of.26 A linear regression assumes
that the score categories are equally spaced and treats the difference between, say, 13 and
12 identically to the difference between, say, 12 and 11. However, the score realizations in
our set-up provide only an ordinal ranking without cardinal saying (see Borooah, 2002).
For comparison and to check robustness, we also run linear regressions. We use truncated
regression models to account for the upper and lower limits of our ESO Design Score.
Using a linear model is rather unproblematic, given that our ordered response can vary
between 5 and 21. In all regression, we use the corporate governance variables (which
are supposed to capture managerial power) as well as the firm controls as independent
variables.
Empirical results on corporate governance can generally be interpreted as either equilib-
rium or our-of equilibrium phenomena (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Given that
increasing empirical evidence suggests that executive compensation is better described as
an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon, we assume in the following analysis that compensation
practices rather follow this second view (see, e.g, Ryan and Wiggins, 2004 or Dittmann
and Maug, 2006). More specifically, we follow the related literature in the field and as-
sume that corporate governance structures are exogenous and set before decisions about
the design of the stock option plans are made (see, e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2004 or Muslu,
2005). We believe that this assumption is consistent with the actual pay-setting process
that is, for example, described in Murphy (1999). In such an out-of-equilibrium environ-
ment, managerial power and the stock option design can be related in a causal way that
is consistent with managerial self-dealing.
26As discussed in Borooah (2002), not treating a variable as ordered, when in fact it is ordered, can lead to a loss in
efficiency.
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From an equilibrium perspective, corporate governance structures (like ownership con-
centration or board outsiders) as well as the design of managerial compensation arise
simultaneously and endogenously, and depend on firm and/or manager characteristics
only. From such a perspective, one should not expect any causal relationship between
governance mechanisms and the design of executive stock option plans. In this view, both
elements are set optimally to maximize shareholder value. Moreover, both are determined
by factors such as unobserved managerial power or the firms operating or informational
environment. This endogeneity could then potentially bias obtained regression results.
We believe that potential endogeneity is not a big concern in our study as the predicted
relationship in such a situation would be the same. Unobserved managerial power, for
example, would affect both corporate governance structures and the design of the ESO
plans in the same direction. Both would be more favorable to the manager. Unobserved
heterogeneity should hence be not much of an issue for our analysis. Potential concerns
could further arise because of causality running in the reverse direction, i.e. from the ESO
design to the corporate governance structures of the firms. While reverse causality is gen-
erally a serious issue in empirical corporate governance studies, we believe that causality
from option design to governance structures is not a plausible story in our set-up.
We nevertheless have the alternative equilibrium perspective in mind and try to be careful
with an interpretation our results and with attempts to infer causalities out of our findings.
The observation that firms with weak corporate governance structures have stock option
program that are desired by managers could therefore have two theoretical explanations:
(i) there is no need for high-powered stock option programs and strong governance schemes
(equilibrium view) or, alternatively, (ii) managers exploit weak governance structures
and missing monitoring devices for self-dealing with favorable stock option plans (out-
of-equilibrium view, which is consistent with our hypothesis). As a consequence of these
methodological issues, we rather concentrate on studying whether empirical regularities
between governance structures and the design of option programs exist in our data set




Summary statistics for a set of sample firm characteristics are presented in Table 2. The
year of observation is 2003. The data was obtained from Datastream. Market capitaliza-
tion is the market value of equity at the end of the year. The mean (median) market
capitalization is approximately 33.8 billion Euro (28.3 billion Euro). The average value of
the firms’ sales is about 34.8 billion Euro (median 29.0 billion Euro), with a maximum
of 141.3 billion Euro. Sales represents gross sales less discounts for industrial firms, and
total operating revenue for financial firms. The mean (median) value of the sample firms’
total assets is 180.5 billion Euro (53.1 billion Euro). Leverage is measured as the ratio of
total debt to total assets. The mean (median) leverage is 0.2588 (0.2618), and the mean
(median) value of Tobin’s Q is 1.1207 (0.7802). Firms generated positive cash flows on
average, with a mean (median) value of EBITDA equal to approximately 5.8 billion Euro
(5.0 billion Euro), and a minimum (maximum) of -444 million Euro (22,6 billion Euro).
EBITDA is defined as earnings before interest expenses, income taxes and depreciation.
Business Risk is measured as defined above and based on annual data from 1998-2003.
The mean (median) value of our business risk measure is 181.86 (52.98). The mean (me-
dian) stock price performance over the five year horizon was about 3.78% (2.62%) p.a.
All currencies were transferred into Euro on the basis of year-end exchange rates.
5.2 Governance Structures and Stock Option Design: Descriptive Results
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics on the ESO Design
Table 3 gives summary statistics for the ESO Design Score Sj and the five subscores.
Recall that Sj is the sum of the five subscores and that the score has a possible range
from 5 to 21. Panel A shows that the mean (median) value of the score is 14.38 (14.00). The
company with the option program that is least favorable to executives has a score value of
8, which is only slightly above the best possible value. Panel A also shows that the highest
ESO Design Score in our data set is 21. Panel B documents that the sample companies
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show a very large variation in the design of their executive stock option programs. If we
define a stock option program as being “not favorable to executives” if Sj is low (Sj ≤
11) and as “favorable to executives” if it is very high (Sj > 15), than only about 27% of
the programs can be considered as being “not favorable”. But on the other hand, around
44% of the programs have to be regarded as being non-satisfactory (“favorable”) as their
program features are designed in a way that is desired by the firms’ top managers. Panel
C of Table 3 gives summary statistics for the five subscores. Recall that the subscores
Relative Performance Target, Absolute Performance Target and Accounting range from 1
to 5, while Participation Structure and Transparency range from 1 to 3 only. Interestingly,
Panel C documents that the absolute performance targets of firms are much less ambitious
than their relative ones (mean values of 4.46 and 3.48, respectively). The median firm
discloses the costs of its ESO programs in the footnotes only. More information on the
exact distribution of the values of the subscores are provided in Panel D. It documents a
large cross-sectional variation in the use of relative performance targets: while some firms
tie option exercises to the outperformance of comparable firms in the same industry, others
completely refrain from implementing a relative performance evaluation. Astonishingly,
68.29% of all firms have absolute performance targets that require annual stock price
increases of below 2%. Panel D also shows that only 22 companies (26.83%) use a fair
value accounting approach to expense the costs of their stock options, while 26 firms
(31.71%) do not disclose or expense ESO costs at all.
Table 4 shows summarized examples of the ESO design features for six selected companies
(including the values for the five subscores as well as the value of overall ESO Design
Score Sj). To get an idea of the heterogeneity of the stock option design across different
industries, Table 5 provides summary statistics for the ESO Design Scores and for the
five subscores for the main industry sectors in our sample (energy, retail, manufacturing,
financial services and telecommunications).
Spearman correlation coefficients between the five subscores as well as the significance
level of each correlation coefficient (in parentheses) and the number of observations used
in calculating the coefficient are presented in Table 6. An important observation is that
none of the subscores are negatively correlated. A negative correlation would have been
problematic for the construction and validity of our overall ESO Design Score as that
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would imply that option plans are systematically favorable to managers in one design
domain while being unfavorable to them in another one. Among other things, the table
shows that firms with low relative performance targets generally have unfocused ESO
programs. Transparency is significantly associated with better relative performance tar-
gets, better accounting practices and more focused participation structures. The table also
shows that firms with high relative benchmarks typically do not seem to simultaneously
employ high absolute performance targets.
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics on Corporate Governance Structures
Descriptive statistics of our corporate governance variables are presented in Table 7. About
61% of the companies in the sample have either common shares or American Depository
Receipts (ADR) that are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Ownership concen-
tration plays an important role in our data set. Ownership structures are much more
concentrated compared to the U.S., with 18.80% of the equity being held by investors
that own more than 5% of the respective firms’ capital (median 12.20%). Not surpris-
ingly, national governments still play a significant role in our sample corporations, with
14.63% of the firms having the state or a government-dependent institution as a signifi-
cant shareholder owning more than 5%. Similarly, about 13.75% of the firms have a family
that holds more than 5% as an owner.
One-tier and two-tier board systems are about equally distributed with approximately
48% of the firms having a one-tier system. The average board consists of 13.63 directors,
a figure that is close to the one reported in Core et al. (1999). Board size, however, varies
widely with the largest board consisting of 22 directors.27 On average, boards have about
69% outside directors, ranging from only 25% to 100%. By and large, our figures on board
independence reflect recent attempts in Europe to strengthen governance structures by
following suggestions made by various national governance committees to increase the
number of independent directors. On average, chairmen serve on 3.59 additional boards
of directors/supervisory boards. Again, the numbers vary widely across the firms (between
0 and 9 additional supervisory mandates). Employees are represented on boards of about
37% of our sample firms, a number that is driven mainly (but not only) by German firms
27One firm has only executive board members and hence a board size of 0.
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as a result of the system of codetermination in Germany. Our measure of managerial
entrenchment, CEO tenure, varies widely across our sample, and the median value of the
variable is 6 years (range from 0 to 30 years).
The mean (median) value for our measure of creditor rights is about 2.20 (2.50) and
respective values for the anti self-dealing variable 0.4316 (0.3700).
5.3 Governance Structures and Stock Option Design: Main Regression Re-
sults
The association between corporate governance structures and the stock option design
is examined using cross-sectional ordered probit models (see Section 4). The regressions
include the ESO Design Score Sj as the ordered response and corporate governance as well
as control variables as regressors. Regression results are presented in Table 8. t-statistics
appear below each estimate in parentheses, based upon heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors. The number of observations (Obs.) vary slightly due to data missings for certain
variables and certain firms.
The regression results show that firms that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange
employ stock option programs that are on average designed in a way that is less desired by
managers. Thus, European companies that are exposed to the U.S. capital market seem
to provide less self-dealing opportunities to their managers (when option programs are
considered). This result is possibly due, at least in part, to the disclosure requirements
that result from listings on the New York Stock Exchange.
Furthermore, we find a negative and significant relation between our measure of ownership
concentration and Sj. That is, firms with a higher fraction of blockholders have ESO plans
that are less favorable to their executives. This finding supports the view that controlling
shareholders are important in monitoring managerial compensation and behavior. They
seem to put pressure on the management in a way that prevents self-dealing with favorably
designed ESO programs. Our evidence on the role of blockholders in exercising corporate
governance complements evidence of other studies in the field. Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Franks and Mayer (2001), Shivdasani (1993) and others also document that large share-
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holders play an active role in corporate governance.28 With respect to the more specific
issue of executive compensation, our finding is in line with results showing that owner-
ship structures and executive compensation are related in the way that better governance
structures are associated with higher pay-performance sensitivities and lower managerial
compensation (see, e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003, Lambert et al. (1993) or Core et al.,
1999). The coefficients for government and family ownership and board structure turned
out to be insignificant, suggesting that family and state ownership and the general board
structure (one-tier vs. two-tier) are not systematically related with the executive stock
option design.
Consistent with the managerial power view, we find a significant association between the
fraction of outsiders on the board and the design of ESO programs. More specifically, our
evidence suggests that a higher percentage of outsiders is generally associated with less
favorable ESO programs. This result is similar to the conclusions in Core et al. (1999),
Chance et al. (2000), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and related papers that docu-
ment the ability of executives to influence compensation packages through their ability to
influence non-independent inside directors. Consequently, we have strong evidence sug-
gesting that board composition of firms is not only of symbolic but rather of economic
importance.
If board sizes increase, we typically expect that boards have greater coordination problems
and hence perform monitoring less effectively. In the case of ESO programs, this would
suggest that executives have more power and exploit these circumstances by influencing
their stock option pay in the way that incentive effects and the overall ESO design become
less ambitious. Contrary to this conjecture, we find that firms with larger boards more
often have less favorable stock option programs.
Further support for the view that governance structures and managerial self-dealing are
related is provided by the coefficient of our creditor rights variable. We find that firms
with greater creditor rights employ ESO programs that are more consistent with economic
recommendations. Strong creditor rights therefore seem to limit the opportunistic behavior
of managers regarding the design of their option programs.
28For further evidence, see Becht et al. (2003) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).
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The estimation results moreover show that the design of a firm’s stock option program
is cross-sectionally related to a company’s growth opportunities (as proxied by Tobin’s
Q), its business risk (as proxied by the standard deviation of the percentage change of
operating income), and its past stock market return. Firms with higher growth opportu-
nities have programs that are more favorable to executives. As growth opportunities are
usually used as a proxy for monitoring difficulties, this result suggests that managers in
firms that are difficult to monitor have more opportunities to design their option pay in a
desired way. An alternative interpretation of our finding is that high volatility companies
with many growth opportunities need to offer broad-based ESO programs that are very
favorable to attract and retain high quality managerial talent. Core et al. (1999) provide
a similar argument to interpret their finding that firms with higher investment oppor-
tunities pay higher CEO compensation. The coefficient of Stock Return is negative and
significant showing that firms with a high annual stock market return over the past five
years generally have ESO plans that are appealing to managers. The coefficients on firm
size (proxied by the log of total assets) and leverage turned out to be statistically insignif-
icant. In terms of overall performance of our econometric models, our regression results
indicate that corporate governance variables together with our controls have significant
power in explaining the observed variation in the design of ESO plans.
Overall, our results provide evidence on the view that when managers have significant
power due to poor governance schemes, stock option programs are generally designed in
a way that is more favorable to managers. We find that a firm’s ownership structure is
related to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the managerial power view.
The significant signs of the variables that capture the influence of blockholders and the
NYSE listing confirm the view that when governance systems are weak, ESO programs
are designed and implemented in way that favors executives. Further support for this
perspective is provided by the finding that weak creditor rights are correlated with fa-
vorable stock option plans. Our results further suggest that the board composition is also
related to the ESO design in a way that supports the arguments of the managerial power
view. Our findings hence seem to suggest that the main variable driving our results is
the power and insulation of the top management. In the subsequent section we provide
various robustness checks to show that our results are robust to different specifications of
our ESO design variable and to different regression models. We also address the question
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of how the design of the stock option plans relates to the size of the CEO’s compensation
and in particular to the volume of his option packages.
5.4 Robustness Checks
5.4.1 Level of Executive Compensations
As a robustness check, we also look at the value of managerial option compensation (and
at the volume of other compensation components). We thereby try to rule out the argu-
ment that option packages might be favorably designed from a managerial perspective,
but at the same time only of small magnitude in terms of transferred option value. In
the subsequent analysis, we focus on the compensation of the CEO as remuneration for
chief executives is most frequently available. Also, CEOs are usually the most power-
ful managers in a firm and in the center of the managerial power hypothesis. Table 9
provides summary statistics on the compensation of the CEOs in our data set. All com-
pensation data is hand-collected from annual reports as standardized data sets such as
ExecuComp are not available for European firms.29 The year of observation is 2003. CEO
Cash Compensation is the sum of the fixed and variable cash compensation paid to a
firm’s CEO. The mean (median) value of cash remuneration to the chief executive in 2003
was 2,763,000 Euro (2,215,000 Euro). We have a total number of 77 observations on CEO
cash compensation. CEO Option Compensation is the value of stock options granted to
the firms’ CEOs in 2003. Stock options were valued using the Black-Scholes formula. If
the exercise price of the options was not explicitly reported, we used the stock price at the
end of the year. If the time to maturity was not reported, we used the mean value of the
time to maturity of the options granted to CEOs were we had data on the maturities (the
mean value was seven years). The packages of granted CEO option had a mean value of
3,207,000 Euro, which is a very significant number for European compensation standards.
Data on stock option compensation was available for 59 out of 82 firms. CEO Stock Com-
pensation is the value of shares granted to CEOs in 2003. It is calculated by multiplying
the number of granted shares by a firm’s stock price at the end of the year. As many firms
did not grant any shares to their CEOs, the mean value of the granted shares was only
29To what extent firms report details on CEO compensation mainly depends on national regulation and on whether or
not a firm is listed in the U.S.
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757,000 Euro. CEO Total Compensation is the sum of CEO Cash Compensation, CEO
Option Compensation, and CEO Stock Compensation, calculated for those firms where
we had information on the value of the option packages.
Table 10 shows estimates of the relationship between the level of CEO compensation (cash
compensation, option compensation and total compensation) and the ESO Design Score
Sj for the 59 firms where we have data on the volume of the option packages. We estimate
linear regressions (OLS) as well as Heckman selection models (Heckit) to account for the
effect that option compensation data is available only for subset of 59 firms.30 Dependent
variables are the logs of CEO Cash Compensation, CEO Option Compensation, and CEO
Total Compensation, respectively. We also employ a dependent variable that captures
CEO Excess Compensation. CEO Excess Compensation is defined as the residual of a
compensation regression where the dependent variable is CEO Total Compensation and
where the independent variables are economic determinants of CEO compensation (tenure,
firm size, and past firm performance). The residual of this equation is often used in the
executive compensation literature as a measure of excess compensation (see, e.g., Yermack
(2006).
The regression results show a positive and significant relationship between the ESO De-
sign Score Sj and the volume of the option packages (CEO Option Compensation). This
relation suggests that more favorable option plans usually coincide with larger option
packages and it further strengthens the results of the previous sections on the managerial
power hypothesis. The ESO Design Score is also positively related to CEO Total Com-
pensation and CEO Excess Compensation, even though this relationship is not as strong
as the one in option compensation regression.
5.4.2 Different ESO Design Score Constructions
(i) Equally-Weighted ESO Design Score
To account for the possibility that the implicit but deliberate under-weighting of the
subscores for Participation Structure and Transparency has an impact on our results, we
30We use legal origin and a dummy for the NYSE listing as variables in the selection equation.
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also performed regressions where all five scores where measured on a one to five scale.31
The resulting new design score is hence an equally-weighted score and is denoted EW
ESO Design Score Sewj , with a possible range from 5 to 25. We again employed ordered
response models using the same set of explanatory variables as in the previous sections.
Table 11 summarizes the regression results. The estimates show that our regression results
and conclusions from the previous section do not change and are hence not sensitive to
the fact that two subscores are measured on a 1 to 3 scale only (with the exception of the
NYSE variable).
(ii) Modified ESO Design Score
We argued that an evaluation of the presence and design of absolute performance targets
might not be justified from a pure agency theoretic point of view. In this subsection, we
therefore provide regression results that were obtained when we excluded the absolute
performance target from our calculation of the overall ESO Design Score Sj. The result-
ing new Modified ESO Design Score is hence calculated on the basis of the following four
subscores: Relative Performance Target, Accounting, Participation Structure, and Trans-
parency. The new Modified ESO Design Score Smodj ranges between 4 and 16. Regression
results (ordered probit) using this modified design score are presented in Table 12.
Overall, the estimates show that our results are robust to the exclusion of a subscore that
evaluates the absolute performance target of a certain ESO plan: the regression results
again document that firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange have stock option
programs that are designed in a way that is less favorable to executives. Moreover, we still
find a negative and significant relation between our measure of ownership concentration
and the ESO Design Score Smodj . We find further evidence suggesting that the fraction
of outsiders on the board is associated with the ESO plan design. Our conclusions from
the previous subsections are therefore robust to the inclusion of a score for an absolute
performance target.
(iii) Principal Component Analysis Based ESO Design Score
In further robustness checks, we also calculated an ESO Design Score based on a principal
31Recall that each of these two subscores ranges from 1 to 3 only, while the others range from 1 to 5. We therefore assigned
the values 1, 3 and 5 instead of 1, 2 and 3 to the realizations of the variables Participation Structure and Transparency.
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component analysis (Spcaj ). We therefore construct a score using the underlying principal
components of the five subscores. The principal component approach explicitly incor-
porates the correlations between the subscores and combines them in a way that best
explains the cross-sectional variance in the ESO data. It is therefore a technique that lets
the data dictate the weights used in calculating the ESO Design Score. Even if we use
this newly constructed score Spcaj , we still find a significant relationship between corporate
governance structures and the stock option design that is consistent with the managerial
power view. More specifically, our results again suggest that firms with higher ownership
concentration and firms with stronger creditor rights have option plans that are less fa-
vorable for managers. Moreover, our measure of board size is again negatively related to
the ESO Design Score.
5.4.3 Different Regression Model
As a final robustness check, we estimate a linear regression model for comparison and to
check robustness. Linear models are generally easier to interpret than ordered response
models and the number of ordered responses for our score should be large enough for a
linear regression model. To account for the upper and lower limits of our ESO Design
Score Sj, we used a truncated model. The regression estimates can be found in Table 13
and show that our results are also robust to a change in the specification of our regression
model.
6 Conclusion
Various features of existing stock option programs have been heavily criticized by share-
holder activists and institutional investors. It is argued that the design of many stock
option programs is an example of managerial self-dealing, and illustrates the inability of
existing corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring executives. There is also increas-
ing criticism by academic scholars which argue that both the escalation and the design of
stock option compensation reflect managerial rent-seeking rather than optimal contract-
ing (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004 and Bebchuk et al., 2002). Based on these critical
views, we investigated empirically whether there really exists an association between the
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design of executive stock option programs and corporate governance structures. We tried
to explain the observed variation in the design of ESO programs with differences in gover-
nance schemes. Simply put, we examined whether firms with weak corporate governance
and powerful managers have stock option programs that are designed in a way that is
favorable to executives.
To perform this task, data on European stock option programs provided a promising and
unique environment. Compared to stock option plans in the U.S., European programs
show much larger variation. They therefore provide a natural environment for an attempt
to test the managerial power approach. We analyzed the association between the stock
option design and corporate governance structures using detailed data on the option pro-
grams of corporations belonging to the the Euro Stoxx 50, the Stoxx 50, and the DAX 30.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We found that cross-sectionally, ownership
variables are related to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the managerial
power view. When ownership concentration is low and the exposition to the U.S. capital
market little, firms have implemented ESO programs that are desired by its executives.
Further support for this view is provided by the finding that firms with weaker creditor
rights more often have stock option plans that are consistent with the managerial power
hypothesis. Our findings further suggest that board structures (fraction of insiders on the
boards) are related to the stock option design in a way that supports the arguments and
predictions of the self-dealing view: firms with few outsiders on average have programs
that are more favorable to managers. Our results are robust to many different specifica-
tions of our main dependent variable and to different regression specifications. We further
control for the volume of the CEO option packages and for the overall level of CEO com-
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
This table provides summary statistics on the firms that are included in our data set. The data was obtained
from Datastream. Market capitalization is the market value of equity at the end of the year. Sales represents
gross sales less discounts for industrial firms, and total operating revenue for financial firms. Total assets is
the sum of total assets, long term receivables, investments, plant, equipment and other assets. Bank loans and
security holdings are also included. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Tobin’s Q is
the market value of a firm’s securities relative to the replacement costs of its tangible assets. We use the Chung
and Pruitt (1994) measure, i.e. the market value of equity, long-term debt, short-term debt, and preferred stock
divided by total assets. EBITDA is earnings before interest expenses, income taxes and depreciation. Business
Risk is measured by the standard deviation of the percentage change of operating income (sales minus total
operating expenses) and is measured with annual data from 1998-2003. Stock Return is the firms’ average
annual stock market return over the prior five years (in percent). The year of observation is 2003.
Firm characteristics
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Market capitalization (million Euro) 33,810 28,301 3,536 136,478 27,537
Sales (million Euro) 34,829 28,991 1,514 141,343 27,900
Total Assets (million Euro) 180,511 53,126 2,453 896,487 250,108
Leverage 0.2588 0.2618 0.0051 0.5333 0.1419
Tobin’s Q 1.1207 0.7802 0.0793 6.7721 1.0984
EBITDA (million Euro) 5,823 4,982 -444 22,645 4,690
Business Risk 181.86 52.98 4.39 2.709 408
Stock Return 3.7790 2.6237 -55.4347 87.7419 17.5508
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Table 3: ESO Design Score and Subscores: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of the ESO Design Score that is used in our empirical analysis. The
sample consists of 82 firms. The year of observation is 2003. For definitions, see Subsection 4.2.
Panel A:
ESO Design Score Sj : Summary Statitics
Mean 14.38 Median 14.00
Min 8.00 Max 21.00
Std.dev. 3.50 Obs. 82
Panel B :
ESO Design Score Sj : Distribution
Realization Freq. Percent Cum.
5 < Sj ≤ 7 0 0.0000 0.0000
7 < Sj ≤ 9 5 0.0610 0.0610
9 < Sj ≤ 11 17 0.2074 0.2683
11 < Sj ≤ 13 14 0.1707 0.4390
13 < Sj ≤ 15 10 0.1220 0.5610
15 < Sj ≤ 17 17 0.2073 0.7683
17 < Sj ≤ 19 14 0.1707 0.9390
19 < Sj ≤ 21 5 0.0610 1.0000
Panel C :
Subscores: Summary Statistics
Subscore Mean Median Std.dev Min. Max.
Relative Performance Target 3.48 4.00 1.48 1.00 5.00
Absolute Performance Target 4.46 5.00 0.84 1.00 5.00
Accounting 3.09 3.00 1.63 1.00 5.00
Participation Structure 1.66 2.00 0.71 1.00 3.00
Transparency 1.70 2.00 0.75 1.00 3.00
Panel D:
Subscores: Frequency of realizations
Subscore 1 2 3 4 5
Relative Performance Target 11 14 14 11 32
Percent 13.41 17.07 17.07 13.41 39.02
Absolute Performance Target 2 0 12 12 56
Percent 2.44 0.00 14.63 14.63 68.29
Accounting 22 13 9 12 26
Percent 26.83 15.85 10.98 14.63 31.71
Participation Structure 39 32 11 - -
Percent 47.56 39.02 13.41 - -
Transparency 39 29 14 - -























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variables
This table provides summary statistics of the corporate governance variables used in our empirical analysis.
The corporate governance data was obtained from 20-F filings and from proxy statements. For a description
of the variables, see Table 2. The year of observation is 2003 and the full sample consists of 82 firms.
Panel A: Ownership variables
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Listing NYSE (0/1) 0.6098
Ownership concentration 18.80 12.20 0.00 83.01 21.77
Government ownership (0/1) 0.1463
Family ownership (0/1) 0.1375
Panel B : Board variables
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Board structure (0/1) 0.4756
Board size 13.63 13.00 0.00 22.00 4.79
Outside directors 0.6867 0.7000 0.2500 1.0000 0.2113
Busy chairman 3.59 3.00 0.00 9.00 2.43
Employee part. (0/1) 0.3704
Tenure CEO 6.89 6.00 0.00 30.00 5.53
Panel C : Legal variables
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Creditor rights 2.1951 2.5000 0.00 4.00 1.3648
Anti self-dealing 0.4316 0.3700 0.2000 0.9500 0.2491
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Table 8: Relationship between ESO Design Score and Corporate Governance Variables: Or-
dered Probit Models
This table shows estimates of ordered response models (ordered probit). The ordered response is the ESO
Design Score Sj . Definitions of the explanatory governance variables are presented in Table 1. As controls,
we use firm size, leverage, Tobin’s Q, business risk, the past stock return, and industry dummies. t-statistics
appear below each estimate in parentheses, based upon heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. * indicates
significance at 10%; ** indicates significance at 5%; *** indicates significance at 1%.
ESO Design Score Sj (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Listing NYSE -0.5773** -0.5728** -0.5778**
(-2.11) (-2.02) (-2.11)
Ownership concentration -1.9557** -2.5398** -2.4049**
(-2.19) (-2.28) (-2.52)
Government ownership 0.5527 0.5618 0.5630
(1.50) (1.51) (1.53)
Board structure 0.5540 0.5829* 0.4754
(1.55) (1.64) (1.11)
Board size -0.1241*** -0.1229*** -0.1122**
(-3.24) (-3.18) (-2.51)
Outside directors -1.9557** -1.8622** -2.0814**
(-2.19) (-2.03) (-2.08)
Busy chairman -0.0960 -0.0890 -0.0976
(-1.48) (-1.31) (-1.49)






Creditor rights -0.6369*** -0.5279*** -0.5179*** -0.5394***
(-5.56) (-4.10) (-4.06) (-3.73)
Anti self-dealing 1.4577*** 0.0209 -0.2325 -0.0839
(2.61) (0.02) (-0.23) (-0.08)
Size 0.4878 0.3499 0.2466 0.2642 0.2137
(1.41) (1.05) (0.70) (0.72) (0.59)
Leverage 0.6953 0.6248 -0.2135 -0.2605 -0.3083
(0.95) (0.86) (-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.39)
Tobin’s Q 0.3428*** 0.3918** 0.4878*** 0.4909*** 0.4803**
(2.59) (2.48) (2.60) (2.60) (2.58)
Business Risk 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006**
(0.43) (1.55) (2.26) (2.48) (2.16)
Stock Return 0.0050 -0.0099 -0.0180* -0.0193* -0.0185*
(0.55) (-1.04) (-1.08) (-1.90) (-1.71)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 82 80 78 77 78
Pseudo R2 0.0288 0.1119 0.1501 0.1500 0.1498
Prob> χ2 0.0244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 9: Summary Statistics on CEO Compensation
This table provides summary statistics on the compensation of the CEOs of the firms in our data set. The year
of observation is 2003. CEO Cash Compensation is the sum of fixed and variable cash compensation paid to a
firm’s CEO. CEO Option Compensation is the value of stock options granted to a firm’s CEOs in 2003. Stock
options were valued using the Black-Scholes formula. If the exercise price of the options was not explicitly
reported, we used the stock price at the end of the year. If the time to maturity was not reported, we used
the mean value of the time to maturity of the options granted to CEOs were we had data on the maturities
(the mean value was 7 years). CEO Stock Compensation is the value of shares granted to CEO in 2003. It is
calculated by multiplying the number of granted shares by a firm’s stock price at the end of the year. CEO
Total Compensation is the sum of CEO Cash Compensation, CEO Option Compensation, and CEO Stock
Compensation. In some cases, only the cash, option or stock compensation to the entire group of executive
board members was reported. In such cases, we calculated the cash, option, and stock compensation of the CEO
by dividing the group number by the number of members on the board and multiplied the resulting number
by two (assuming a higher compensation for the CEO compared to ordinary executive board members). All
values are in thousand Euro. The table reports means, medians, the 25 and 75% percentile as well as the
standard deviation. We also report the number of observations (Obs.) that was available for the respective
variables. The number of observations differ as a result of different degrees of data availability.
Compensation Component Mean Median 25% 75% Std.dev. Obs.
CEO Cash Compensation (’000 Euro) 2,763 2,215 1,695 3,100 1,702 77
CEO Option Compensation (’000 Euro) 3,207 1,914 628 4,004 3,057 59
CEO Stock Compensation (’000 Euro) 757 0 0 407 2,266 78










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Relationship between Equally-Weighted ESO Design Score and Corporate Gover-
nance Variables: Ordered Probit Models
This table shows estimates of ordered response models (ordered probit). The ordered response is the equally-
weighted design score EW ESO Design Score Sewj . Hereby, all subscores were measured on a 1 to 5 scale.
Definitions of the explanatory governance variables are presented in Table 1. As controls, we use firm size,
leverage, Tobin’s Q, business risk, the past stock return, and industry dummies. t-statistics appear below each
estimate in parentheses, based upon heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. * indicates significance at 10%;
** indicates significance at 5%; *** indicates significance at 1%.
EW ESO Design Score Sewj (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Listing NYSE -0.3266 -0.3030 -0.3263
(-1.18) (-1.04) (-1.18)
Ownership concentration -2.4232*** -2.5419** -2.4219***
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.60)
Government ownership 0.5187 0.5408 0.5241
(1.53) (1.52) (1.54)
Board structure 0.7110** 0.7152** 0.6721
(2.01) (2.02) (1.59)
Board size -0.1160*** -0.1137*** -0.1100***
(-3.15) (-3.04) (-2.56)
Outside directors -1.6681* -1.6291* -1.7293*
(-1.90) (-1.77) (-1.77)
Busy chairman -0.0868 -0.0839 -0.0875
(-1.37) (-1.24) (-1.37)






Creditor rights -0.6377** -0.4908*** -0.4890*** -0.4961***
(-5.55) (-3.61) (-3.62) (-3.33)
Anti self-dealing 1.3255** -0.6741 -0.5668 -0.6345
(2.38) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.61)
Size 0.4780 0.3127 0.1746 0.1698 0.1580
(1.30) (0.91) (0.49) (0.46) (0.44)
Leverage 0.6665 0.6128 -0.5081 -0.5668 -0.5563
(0.89) (0.85) (-0.64) (-0.69) (-0.72)
Tobin’s Q 0.3495*** 0.4068*** 0.4884** 0.4857** 0.4845**
(2.58) (2.62) (2.52) (2.51) (2.53)
Business Risk 0.0002 0.0004* 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007***
(0.64) (1.78) (2.63) (2.89) (2.58)
Stock Return 0.0028 -0.0124 -0.0226** -0.0237** -0.0228**
(0.30) (-1.28) (-1.99) (-2.18) (-1.98)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 82 80 78 77 78
Pseudo R2 0.0250 0.1021 0.1349 0.1350 0.1350
Prob> χ2 0.0325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 12: Relationship between Modified ESO Design Score and Corporate Governance Vari-
ables: Ordered Probit Models
This table shows estimates of ordered response models (ordered probit). The ordered response is the modified
design score Modified ESO Design Score Smodj . Hereby, the subscore Absolute Performance Target was not
included in the calculation of the design score. Definitions of the explanatory governance variables are presented
in Table 1. As controls, we use firm size, leverage, Tobin’s Q, business risk, the past stock return, and industry
dummies. t-statistics appear below each estimate in parentheses, based upon heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors. * indicates significance at 10%; ** indicates significance at 5%; *** indicates significance at 1%.
Modified ESO Design Score Smodj (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Listing NYSE -0.5852** -0.5817* -0.5871*
(-2.03) (-1.94) (-2.01)
Ownership concentration -2.3799** -2.5969** -2.3846**
(-2.52) (-2.28) (-2.53)
Government ownership 0.6594* 0.6828* 0.6900*
(-1.73) (1.71) (1.81)
Board structure 0.6393** 0.6756** 0.4510
(2.05) (2.12) (1.25)
Board size -0.1036*** -0.1015*** -0.0747*
(-2.62) (-2.63) (-1.68)
Outside directors -2.0815** -1.9383** -2.3877**
(-2.19) (-2.03) (-2.22)
Busy chairman -0.1180* -0.1079 -0.1227*
(-1.88) (-1.65) (-1.93)






Creditor rights -0.6101*** -0.5239*** -0.5123*** -0.5512***
(-5.62) (-4.66) (-4.55) (-4.39)
Anti self-dealing 0.9112** -0.5114 -0.5867 -0.3195
(1.53) (-0.49) (-0.56) (-0.29)
Size 0.6290* 0.5565 0.5254 0.5482 0.4458
(1.80) (1.64) (1.42) (1.43) (1.18)
Leverage 0.9934 1.0595 0.2116 0.1484 -0.0179
(1.27) (1.42) (0.26) (0.18) (-0.02)
Tobin’s Q 0.3276** 0.3947** 0.4838** 0.4919** 0.4657**
(2.29) (2.43) (2.45) (2.46) (2.37)
Business Risk 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0004
(0.39) (1.20) (1.66) (1.89) (1.49)
Stock Return 0.0014 -0.0135 -0.0214* -0.0235** -0.0227*
(0.16) (-1.42) (-1.89) (-2.16) (-1.97)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 82 80 78 77 78
Pseudo R2 0.0325 0.1218 0.1589 0.1598 0.1610
Prob> χ2 0.1506 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
48
Table 13: Relationship between ESO Design Score and Corporate Governance Variables:
Truncated Linear Regressions
This table shows estimates of a truncated linear regression model. The truncated dependent variable is the
the ESO Design Score Sj . Definitions of the explanatory governance variables are presented in Table 1. As
controls, we use firm size, leverage, Tobin’s Q, business risk, the past stock return, and industry dummies.
t-statistics appear below each estimate in parentheses, based upon heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
* indicates significance at 10%; ** indicates significance at 5%; *** indicates significance at 1%.
ESO Design Score Sj (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Listing NYSE -1.3340** -1.3395* -1.3335**
(-2.06) (-1.95) (-2.05)
Ownership concentration -4.8052** -5.1471** -4.7555**
(-2.25) (-1.97) (-2.24)
Government ownership 1.2811 1.3256 1.2911
(1.42) (1.41) (1.44)
Board structure 1.6206* 1.7057* 0.4354
(1.67) (1.74) (1.27)
Board size -0.2728*** -0.2712*** -0.2462**
(-3.02) (-2.95) (-2.21)
Outside directors -4.2092* -3.9971* -4.4448*
(-1.91) (-1.67) (-1.86)
Busy chairman -0.2193 -0.2036 -0.2213
(-1.41) (-1.19) (-1.41)






Creditor rights -1.8123*** -1.3170*** -1.3078*** -1.3366***
(-6.16) (-4.56) (-4.46) (-4.22)
Anti self-dealing 4.3126*** -0.3348 -0.4703 -0.1679
(2.65) (-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.06)
Size 1.8814 0.9384 0.6873 0.7319 0.6173
(1.54) (1.04) (0.72) (0.73) (0.62)
Leverage 3.0552 1.9431 -0.2621 -0.3752 -0.4521
(1.07) (0.93) (-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.23)
Tobin’s Q 1.4882** 1.1989** 1.2752** 1.2929*** 1.2566**
(2.35) (2.50) (2.55) (2.57) (2.51)
Business Risk 0.0008 0.0012 0.0016** 0.0016** 0.0015**
(0.58) (1.61) (2.20) (2.43) (2.12)
Stock Return 0.0274 -0.0228 -0.0400 -0.0435 -0.0410
(0.72) (-0.84) (-1.43) (-1.61) (-1.46)
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 82 80 78 77 78
Prob> χ2 0.1321 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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